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SIXTH CIRCUIT REVIEW 
Religious Accommodations for County Clerks? 
RUTH COLKER 
Rowan County Clerk Kim Davis engendered considerable controversy 
after she instituted a “no marriage licenses” policy to avoid 
facilitating the marriages of same-sex couples in conflict with her 
religious beliefs.1 Federal District Court Judge David L. Bunning has 
been overseeing this dispute,2 which has included intermittent appeals 
to the Sixth Circuit,3 and even the United States Supreme Court.4 
What is the basis and strength of her religious freedom claim? Is the 
only solution to the conflict between her sincerely held religious 
beliefs and the right of same-sex couples to marry for Davis to resign 
from her position as county clerk? The likely answer is yes. 
 
Davis has used religious freedom arguments to be exempted from 
issuing same-sex marriage licenses and certificates. She has argued 
she should not be held in contempt for disobeying a federal court’s 
order to issue marriage licenses and certificates because her refusal is 
based on sincerely held religious beliefs.5 She has also filed a third-
party complaint in federal court against Kentucky Governor Steve 
Beshear and Commissioner Wayne Onkst6 seeking primarily an 
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 1 See generally Miller v. Davis, No. 15-CV-44-DLB, 2015 WL 4866729 (E.D. Ky. 
Aug. 12, 2015) (granting plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction). 
 2 Id. 
 3 See, e.g., Appellant Kim Davis’ Emergency Motion for Immediate Consideration 
and Motion to Stay District Court’s September 3, 2015 Injunction Order Pending Appeal, 
Miller v. Davis, No. 15-5880 (6th Cir. Sept. 11, 2015) [hereinafter 6th Circuit Motion to 
Stay]. 
 4 See Emergency Application to Stay Preliminary Injunction Pending Appeal, Davis 
v. Miller, No. 15A250 (U.S. Aug. 28, 2015) [hereinafter Supreme Court Application to 
Stay]. 
 5 See infra Part II. 
 6 Onkst is the Commissioner of the Kentucky Department for Libraries and Archives, 
which has responsibility for creating uniform marriage license and certificate forms. See 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402.100 (LexisNexis 2010). 
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exemption under state law from issuing marriage licenses and 
certificates in conflict with her religious beliefs.7 
 
Part I of this article places Davis’ legal claims in historical context. 
Part II discusses the strength of her religious freedom argument. Part 
III concludes by suggesting how these kinds of claims should be 
considered in the future. While Davis may have a cognizable claim 
that her religious freedom is “substantially burdened” by issuing 
marriage licenses and marriage certificates, it may not be possible for 
a court to fashion an accommodation under state religious freedom 
law without unconstitutionally demeaning the marriages of gay men 
and lesbians. 
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I. THE LEGAL CONTEXT 
In the 1990 Supreme Court case Employment Division v. Smith,8 the Court 
held that Native American plaintiffs, charged with using peyote in religious 
rituals, could not use a freedom of religion defense to continue their religious 
practice without state interference.9 The Supreme Court used low-level 
rational basis review to consider their freedom of religion defense, because 
they could not show that the state enacted the law for the purpose of burdening 
their freedom of religion.10 
                                                                                                                     
 7 See infra Part II. 
 8 Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 9 Id. at 879 (“[T]he right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the 
obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground 
that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or 
proscribes).’”) (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982)). 
 10 Id. at 882 (“There being no contention that Oregon’s drug law represents an attempt 
to regulate religious beliefs, the communication of religious beliefs, or the raising of one’s 
children in those beliefs, the rule to which we have adhered since Reynolds plainly 
controls.”). 
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In response to the Smith decision, Congress enacted the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA).11 This statute implemented a strict 
scrutiny standard for freedom of religion claims, making it easier for plaintiffs 
to attain accommodations when their religious freedom is burdened by 
governmental action. Nonetheless, in 1997, the Supreme Court held in City of 
Boerne v. Flores12 that Congress had exceeded its authority in making state 
governmental action subject to RFRA.13 After the Boerne decision, many 
states, including Kentucky,14 passed their own religious freedom statutes with 
language similar to the RFRA.15 
Meanwhile, the Kentucky legislature enacted a statute in 1998,16 and a 
constitutional amendment in 2004,17 restricting marriage to one man and one 
woman. Following the 2013 Supreme Court decision in United States v. 
Windsor,18 which overturned Section 3 of the federal Defense of Marriage Act 
(DOMA),19 Gregory Bourke and Michael Deleon were among a group of 
same-sex couples who filed suit in federal court against Governor Beshear 
seeking to invalidate Kentucky’s ban on same-sex marriage.20 On February 12, 
2014, the court, relying on Windsor, issued a decision holding Kentucky’s ban 
on same-sex marriage unconstitutional.21 
Kim Davis, who considers herself to be a devout Christian, was elected 
county clerk for Rowan, Kentucky on November 4, 2014, and took office on 
January 1, 2015, for a four-year term.22 Two days after she was elected county 
clerk, the Sixth Circuit overturned the lower court decision that invalidated 
Kentucky’s ban on same-sex marriage.23 In January 2015, shortly after Davis 
took office, the United States Supreme Court announced it would accept 
                                                                                                                     
 11 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 
(2012).  
 12 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 13 Id. at 536 (“RFRA contradicts vital principles necessary to maintain separation of 
powers and the federal balance.”). 
 14 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 446.350 (LexisNexis 2010). Kentucky’s law was passed in 
2013 in response to a case involving an Amish buggy driver who was required to display 
colorful signage in violation of his religious principles. See Gingerich v. Commonwealth, 
382 S.W.3d 835, 844 (Ky. 2012).  
 15 See generally W. Cole Durham, Jr., State RFRAs and the Scope of Free Exercise 
Protection, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 665 (1999) (analyzing current and proposed state RFRA 
legislation). 
 16 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402.005 (LexisNexis 2010). 
 17 KY. CONST. § 233A.  
 18 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).  
 19 See id. at 2682; Defense of Marriage Act § 3(a), 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012) (defining 
marriage, under federal law, as “a legal union between one man and one woman”). 
 20 See Bourke v. Beshear, 996 F. Supp. 2d 542, 546 (W.D. Ky. 2014). 
 21 Id. at 554. 
 22 See Verified Third-Party Complaint of Defendant Kim Davis at 2–7, Miller v. 
Davis, No. 15-CV-44-DLB (E.D. Ky. Aug. 4, 2015) [hereinafter Davis Third-Party 
Complaint]. 
 23 DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 421 (6th Cir. 2014). 
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certiorari in Obergefell v. Hodges, which included an appeal from the 
Kentucky same-sex marriage case.24 One week later, concerned that she would 
soon be required to issue marriage licenses and certificates in conflict with her 
religious beliefs,25 Davis requested that state legislators support “legislation 
that would give county clerks the option to exempt themselves from issuing 
marriage license, [sic] not only to same sex couples but to all parties, as to not 
discriminate [sic] anyone.”26 
The Supreme Court overturned the Sixth Circuit’s same-sex marriage 
decision on June 26, 2015.27 On that same day, Governor Beshear sent a letter 
to all Kentucky clerks instructing them to use a new form that recognized 
same-sex marriages, and thereby implemented the Obergefell decision.28 He 
urged them to “respect the rule of law” and made no mention of religious 
exemptions of any kind for clerks or other state officials.29 
The next day, Davis announced that her office would discontinue issuing 
marriage licenses in Rowan County to all couples.30 One week later, four 
couples filed suit, requesting a federal court to preliminarily enjoin Davis from 
violating their federal constitutional rights.31 In this lawsuit, Davis has argued 
that the court should respect her right to religious freedom and not enjoin her 
from refusing to issue marriage licenses.32 Further, on August 4, 2015, Davis 
filed a third-party complaint in federal court against Governor Beshear and 
Commissioner Onkst33 seeking a religious exemption from authorizing the 
issuance of Kentucky marriage licenses.34 
                                                                                                                     
 24 01/16/15 Miscellaneous Order, 2014 Term Court Orders, U.S. Supreme Court (Jan. 
16, 2015), http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/011615zr_f2q3.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/ 
JWA4-WW34] (listing cases for which the Court granted certiorari). 
 25 Davis Third-Party Complaint, supra note 22, at 8. The actual content of state 
marriage law will be discussed in Part III, infra. 
 26 See Supreme Court Application to Stay, supra note 4, at E-36. 
 27 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015). 
 28 See Kentucky Gov. Steve Beshear Orders Kentucky County Clerks to Recognize 
Same Sex Marriages, WDRB NEWS (June 26, 2015), http://www.wdrb.com/story/ 
29417314/kentucky-gov-steve-beshear-orders-kentucky-county-clerks-to-recognize-same-
sex-marriages [http://perma.cc/H8Z2-MAN5].  
 29 Id. 
 30 See John Cheves, Several Kentucky County Clerks Defy Same-Sex Marriage 
Ruling, Refuse to Issue Marriage Licenses, KENTUCKY.COM (June 29, 2015), 
http://www.kentucky.com/2015/06/29/3923157/some-kentucky-county-clerks-
refusing.html [http://perma.cc/T94W-GS7N]. 
 31 See Complaint at 1–2, Miller v. Davis, No. 15-CV-44-DLB (E.D. Ky. July 2, 
2015).  
 32 See Miller v. Davis, No. 15-CV-44-DLB, 2015 WL 4866729, at *1 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 
12, 2015). 
 33 See Davis Third-Party Complaint, supra note 22, at 2–7.  
 34 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402.100 (LexisNexis 2010). 
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On August 12, 2015, the court granted a preliminary injunction to the four 
couples that had sought marriage licenses in the first legal action.35 The Sixth 
Circuit36 and the United States Supreme Court37 denied Davis’ emergency 
motion for a stay pending appeal. 
On September 3, 2015, the court held Davis in contempt and jailed her for 
disobeying the court’s order to issue marriage licenses.38 On September 8, 
2015, the court received a status report from the plaintiffs indicating that they 
had been able to obtain marriage licenses while Davis was in custody.39 The 
court ordered Davis released from custody so long as she does “not interfere in 
any way, directly or indirectly, with the efforts of her deputy clerks to issue 
marriage licenses to all legally eligible couples”40 and ordered a status report 
every fourteen days.41 Davis has appealed this contempt decision to the Sixth 
Circuit, seeking a stay of the contempt order pending appeal.42 Further, on 
September 11, 2015, the district court ruled on Davis’ third-party complaint, 
denying her motion for injunctive relief.43 
On September 14, 2015, after returning to work upon her release from jail, 
Davis confiscated all the office’s licenses and certificates to delete all 
references to the county clerk or the name of the county.44 She also eliminated 
any signature or notary on some of the forms.45 Further, she modified the 
forms to state that they were issued “Pursuant to Federal Court Order #15-CV-
                                                                                                                     
 35 Miller, 2015 WL 4866729, at *15. 
 36 See Order, Miller v. Davis, No. 15-5880 (6th Cir. Sept. 17, 2015) (“On August 28, 
2015, we denied Davis’s motion for a stay of the August 12 preliminary injunction pending 
appeal.”); see also 6th Circuit Motion to Stay, supra note 3. 
 37 See Order in Pending Case, Davis v. Miller, No. 15A250 (U.S. Aug. 31, 2015) 
(“The application for stay presented to Justice Kagan and by her referred to the Court is 
denied.”); see also Supreme Court Application to Stay, supra note 4. 
 38 Order, Miller v. Davis, No. 15-CV-44-DLB (E.D. Ky. Sept. 3, 2015) (finding Davis 
in contempt of the district court’s August 12, 2015 Order). 
 39 Order, Miller v. Davis, No. 15-CV-44-DLB (E.D. Ky. Sept. 8, 2015) (ordering 
Davis’ release from custody upon finding that the Rowan County Clerk’s Office was 
complying with the district court’s August 12, 2015 Order). 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 See Civil Appeal Statement of Parties and Issues, Miller v. Davis, No. 15-5978 (6th 
Cir. Sept. 17, 2015); see also Appellant Kim Davis’ Reply in Support of Emergency 
Motion for Immediate Consideration and Motion to Stay District Court’s September 3, 
2015 Contempt Order Pending Appeal, Miller v. Davis, No. 15-5978 (6th Cir. Sept. 25, 
2015). 
 43 Memorandum Order, Miller v. Davis, No. 15-CV-44-DLB (E.D. Ky. Sept. 11, 
2015) [hereinafter District Court Order] (denying Davis’ Motion for Injunctive Relief). 
 44 Notice at 1–2, Miller v. Davis, No. 15-CV-44-DLB (E.D. Ky. Sept. 18, 2015) 
(report by Defendant Deputy Clerk Brian Mason on the changes in the Rowan County 
Clerk’s Office in response to the district court’s orders).  
 45 Id. 
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44 DLB.”46 In response to Davis’ conduct, on September 21, 2015, the 
plaintiffs in the first legal action submitted a motion to enforce the court’s 
orders of September 3 and September 8, by asking the court to enjoin Davis 
from altering state marriage licenses and certificates.47 
The district court and court of appeals continue to consider the merits of 
the original legal action brought by the couples seeking to get married, and 
Davis’ third-party complaint. 
II. DAVIS’ RELIGIOUS FREEDOM CLAIM 
A. Introduction 
This case involves two legal actions. In the first legal action, four couples 
challenged Davis’ “no marriage licenses” policy at her county office and 
sought a preliminary injunction to require her to issue marriage licenses and 
certificates.48 Davis made several arguments for why a preliminary injunction 
should not be issued. Principally, she argued that such an injunction would 
harm her right to religious freedom as protected by the Kentucky Religious 
Freedom Act (KRFA).49 In a twenty-eight page opinion granting the 
preliminary injunction, the court only allotted a page and a half to this 
argument, most of which was spent quoting the relevant state statute.50 The 
court disposed of Davis’ religious freedom argument under state law by 
finding that her religious burden was merely “slight.”51 Similarly, in its 
decision to deny a stay pending appeal, the Sixth Circuit gave no consideration 
to this argument.52 
In the second legal action, Davis requested, among other relief, that 
Governor Beshear and Commissioner Onkst be required to exempt her from 
having to authorize the issuance of Kentucky marriage licenses, as required by 
the KRFA.53 She lost this argument on procedural grounds.54 
                                                                                                                     
 46 Motion to Enforce September 3 and September 8 Orders at Exhibit 1, Miller v. 
Davis, No. 15-CV-44-DLB (E.D. Ky. Sept. 21, 2015). 
 47 Id. at 1. 
 48 See Miller v. Davis, No. 15-CV-44-DLB, 2015 WL 4866729, at *1 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 
12, 2015). 
 49 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 446.350 (LexisNexis 2010). 
 50 Miller, 2015 WL 4866729, at *14–15. Further, while the court discusses and quotes 
the Kentucky Religious Freedom Act, it concludes that her rights were not violated under 
Section 5 of the Kentucky Constitution; the Kentucky Constitution standard, however, is 
not the same as the Kentucky statutory standard. Id. 
 51 Id. at *15. 
 52 See Order, Miller v. Davis, No. 15-5880 (6th Cir. Aug. 26, 2015) (denying Davis’ 
motion for a stay of the preliminary injunction pending appeal). 
 53 Davis Third-Party Complaint, supra note 22, at 15–16. 
 54 District Court Order, supra note 43, at 5–6 (finding that the action can only be 
heard in state court). 
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Thus, in both legal actions, Davis invoked the KRFA to seek an exemption 
from issuing marriage licenses. A close analysis of this statute is necessary to 
evaluate the strength of her claim. Kentucky’s Religious Freedom Act reads: 
Government ‘shall not substantially burden a person’s freedom of 
religion. The right to act or refuse to act in a manner motivated by a sincerely 
held religious belief may not be substantially burdened unless the government 
proves by clear and convincing evidence that it has a compelling 
governmental interest in infringing the specific act or refusal to act and has 
used the least restrictive means to further that interest. A “burden” shall 
include indirect burdens such as withholding benefits, assessing penalties, or 
an exclusion from programs or access to facilities.55 
Under the KRFA, Davis may request the “right to act” or the right to 
“refuse to act” if she can demonstrate that governmental action has imposed a 
substantial burden on her religious belief. If she meets that burden of proof, 
then the government must demonstrate (1) that it has a compelling 
governmental interest in enforcing the challenged policy and (2) that it has 
used the least restrictive means to attain that governmental interest. If the 
government satisfies both prongs, then Davis is not entitled to an exemption 
from a duty to follow state law. 
B. Davis’ Religious Belief 
The starting point in applying the KRFA is to connect one’s religious 
beliefs to the request to refuse to follow state law. This aspect of Davis’ claim 
deserves close attention. 
What is Davis’ relevant religious belief? At a hearing on July 20, 2015, 
Davis testified, “[M]y religious beliefs can’t condone issuing and being a party 
to the issuance of a same-sex marriage license.”56 
How does that religious belief relate to her request for an exemption from 
state law? Based on her religious belief, one would expect her to request an 
exemption from issuing same-sex marriage licenses. Yet, that was not her 
request. Before Obergefell was decided, Davis requested state “legislation that 
would give county clerks the option to exempt themselves from issuing 
marriage license, [sic] not only to same sex couples but to all parties, as to not 
discriminate [sic] anyone.”57 After Obergefell was decided, she refused to 
issue any marriage licenses or certificates. She explained at the July hearing 
that her office refused to issue any marriage licenses “so [they] didn’t 
                                                                                                                     
 55 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 446.350 (LexisNexis 2010). HB 279 was enacted in 2013 
over the Governor’s veto. Jennifer A. Pekman, Note, The Kentucky Religious Freedom Act: 
Neither a Savior for the Free Exercise of Religion nor a Monstrous Threat to Civil Rights, 
103 Ky. L.J. 127, 127 (2014–2015). 
 56 Transcript of Preliminary Injunction Hearing at 62, Miller v. Davis, No. 15-CV-44-
DLB (E.D. Ky. July 20, 2015). 
 57 See Supreme Court Application to Stay, supra note 4, at E-36. 
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discriminate against any party.”58 But she did not claim that the “no licenses” 
policy was mandated by her religious beliefs. In fact, before Obergefell was 
decided, Davis issued marriage licenses and certificates to opposite-sex 
partners. 
Requesting accommodation allowing her to refuse all marriage licenses 
presents a legal quandary that was not discussed by the district court. The 
KRFA provides no basis for Davis’ request for an exemption beyond those 
“motivated” by her religious beliefs. If she limited her request for exemption 
to the acts (or refusals to act) that are motivated by her religious beliefs, then 
she would ask to be excused from issuing only same-sex marriage licenses. 
However, asking the state to excuse her from issuing marriage licenses to 
same-sex couples would be asking the state to use the KRFA to treat same-sex 
couples differently than opposite-sex couples in violation of the equal 
protection clause.59 Under principles of federal constitutional supremacy, a 
state statute cannot be used as a vehicle for the denial of an individual’s 
constitutional rights.60 Therefore, Davis probably asked to be excused from 
issuing all marriage licenses to avoid asking the state to take an 
unconstitutional position. 
Parallels can be drawn to Loving v. Virginia. When a couple was 
convicted of violating Virginia’s anti-miscegenation statute, the trial court 
found that “Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and 
red, and he placed them on separate continents. . . . The fact that he separated 
the races shows that he did not intend for the races to mix.”61 The Supreme 
Court, in overturning the statute, gave no weight to the state court’s religious 
basis for enforcing the anti-miscegenation statute. “Under our Constitution, the 
freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides with the 
individual and cannot be infringed by the State.”62 Similarly, Davis’ religious 
justification for denying marriage licenses to same-sex couples but not 
opposite-sex couples is irrelevant to the issue of whether her actions, as a state 
actor, violate the right to marry protected by the United States Constitution. 
The state of Kentucky cannot apply the KRFA to exempt Davis from issuing 
marriage licenses in a way that conflicts with the state’s obligation to protect 
the fundamental right to marry, as interpreted by Obergefell. 
Perhaps Davis knew that she could not use the KRFA to request 
exemption only from same-sex marriages, due to these constitutional 
problems. Thus, she requested to be exempt from issuing all marriage licenses. 
                                                                                                                     
 58 Transcript of Preliminary Injunction Hearing, supra note 56, at 62. 
 59 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015) (“It demeans gays and 
lesbians for the State to lock them out of a central institution of the Nation’s society.”). 
 60 Id. Thus, Obergefell invalidated Kentucky’s marriage statute and constitutional 
provision, which had precluded same-sex marriages. See id. at 2608. The KRFA is merely 
another state statute and, like the Kentucky marriage laws, cannot be used to violate the 
constitutional right of Kentucky citizens to marry. 
 61 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3 (1967) (quoting trial court judge). 
 62 Id. at 12. 
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But that broader request, even if it is constitutionally permissible, needs to be 
based on the language of the KRFA. And it is not.  
C. Substantial Burden 
If Davis makes a cognizable claim that her request for exemption from 
state law is motivated by her religious beliefs, the next question is whether 
state law imposes a “substantial burden” on her. The answer to that question 
lies in the relevant state marriage laws. 
Kentucky law requires a couple seeking to marry to (1) obtain a marriage 
license, and (2) obtain a marriage certificate.63 The “clerk of the county” must 
issue the marriage license.64 In addition, the marriage license must include 
“the signature of the county clerk or deputy clerk issuing the license.”65 The 
disjunctive “or” in the signature requirement suggests that the county clerk 
does not have to be the individual signing the marriage license. Nonetheless, 
the language about “issuing” the marriage license requires the county clerk to 
issue it. 
The marriage certificate must include “[a] signed statement by the county 
clerk or a deputy county clerk of the county in which the marriage license was 
issued that the marriage certificate was recorded.”66 Similarly, the “or” 
statement suggests that the county clerk does not have to be the individual 
signing the marriage certificate. 
Further, in carrying out the issuance of marriage licenses and certificates, 
state law requires the county clerk to use the form developed by the state—
without alteration.67 Accordingly, Davis’ obligation to have her name appear 
on these documents seems to stem not from the statute itself but from the 
state’s decision to create forms that have a line for the “county clerk.”68 
Davis testified that she objected to her name and Rowan County being on 
these forms.69 Even if the deputy signed the form, she informed the judge that 
she objected to Rowan County’s name being on the form stating, “It is still my 
authority as county clerk that issues it through my deputy.”70 She testified, 
“[M]y religious beliefs can’t condone issuing and being a party to the issuance 
of a same-sex marriage license.”71 The legal question is whether she can meet 
the statutory requirement of demonstrating that these state law requirements 
“substantially burdened” her freedom of religion. 
                                                                                                                     
 63 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402.100 (LexisNexis 2010). 
 64 § 402.080. 
 65 § 402.100(1)(c) (emphasis added). 
 66 § 402.100(2)(d) (emphasis added). 
 67 See § 402.100. 
 68 The Kentucky Department for Libraries and Archives has the responsibility for 
creating uniform marriage license and certificate forms. See § 402.100. 
 69 Transcript of Preliminary Injunction Hearing, supra note 56, at 80. 
 70 Id. at 81. 
 71 Id. at 62. 
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A Supreme Court case analyzing the same language under the federal 
RFRA can be illuminating in understanding whether she met the substantial 
burden requirement. In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,72 the plaintiffs 
objected to a provision of the Affordable Care Act (ACA)73 requiring their 
employee health plan to offer coverage of four contraceptives.74 They did not 
seek to be exempted from the ACA entirely; they merely sought exemption 
from the requirement to offer those four contraceptives in their health care 
plan. The Court found the substantial burden requirement was met and 
cautioned that it is not appropriate for a judge to “say that their religious 
beliefs are mistaken or insubstantial.”75 
In applying the substantial burden test from Hobby Lobby, it is helpful to 
distinguish between Davis’ objection to having her name appear on the 
documents and her objection to having the name of the county appear on the 
documents. The first objection is easily analogous to the plaintiffs’ objection 
in Hobby Lobby and seems to meet the substantial burden test. The Hobby 
Lobby plaintiffs did not want their employees to have a company-provided 
insurance card that covered contraceptives to which they objected. Similarly, 
Davis does not want married couples to have a marriage certificate, with her 
name on it, which authorizes a marriage to which she objects. These burdens 
seem comparable. 
Davis’ objection to the name of the county appearing on the forms, 
however, is problematic because the connection to being complicit in the 
issuance of the marriage licenses from the county is more attenuated than a 
connection to her as an individual. Despite the Hobby Lobby language broadly 
interpreting “substantial burden,” the Seventh Circuit concluded that Wheaton 
College could not establish a “substantial burden” under the RFRA by merely 
being required to notify its insurers or the federal government of its objection 
to covering certain contraceptives.76 The Seventh Circuit rejected the 
argument that notification makes Wheaton College “involuntarily complicit in 
the provision of emergency contraception.”77 Similarly, Davis is arguably not 
complicit in facilitating same-sex marriage, in violation of her religious 
                                                                                                                     
 72 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 73 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2713, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) 
(2012). 
 74 The Plaintiffs opposed these four contraceptives, because they considered them to 
be abortifacients. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2762, 2765. 
 75 Id. at 2779 (finding that plaintiffs “sincerely believe that providing the insurance 
coverage demanded by the HHS regulations lies on the forbidden side of the line, and it is 
not for us to say that their religious beliefs are mistaken or insubstantial”). The Supreme 
Court did not have to consider whether the plaintiffs met the “motivated by” test that is 
included in the KRFA, because the federal RFRA does not have the “motivated by” 
language. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) § 3, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000bb-1 (2012).  
 76 See Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 791 F.3d 792, 801 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 77 Id. at 796.  
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beliefs, when she notifies her deputy clerk of her objection and only the name 
of the county appears on the document. 
Nonetheless, the Eighth Circuit recently found in a fact pattern similar to 
Wheaton College that a court must accept the plaintiffs’ “assertion that self-
certification under the accommodation process . . . would violate their 
sincerely held religious beliefs.”78 It is therefore unclear how closely a court 
should examine the purported connection between a person’s religious belief 
and the state law requirement, depending on whether one accepts the view of 
the Seventh or Eighth Circuit. 
D. Compelling State Interest 
If Davis establishes a substantial burden on her religious exercise, then the 
burden of proof shifts to the government to demonstrate by clear and 
convincing evidence that it has a compelling state interest in the challenged 
rule. In this case, that rule is that clerks must issue marriage licenses and 
certificates. The government can easily meet the compelling state interest 
requirement because state courts and state officials have a strong interest in 
protecting the fundamental rights of their citizens, such as the right to marry.79 
The government’s compelling state interest has grown stronger as the facts 
have developed. Davis has recently insisted on altering the marriage 
certificate—removing the notarization and state seal—which impugns the 
integrity of the instrument. The government has a compelling interest in 
ensuring the authenticity of its official records.80 Further, the government has 
a compelling interest in controlling the content of its own speech, especially 
when it is seeking to avoid Establishment Clause violations.81 Government is 
allowed to make and implement its own value judgments.82 Davis has also 
modified the document to say that it is issued “pursuant to Federal Court Order 
#15-CV-44 DLB,” which is a subtle way for Davis to suggest it is a second-
class marriage document. Obergefell emphasized that all marriages should be 
                                                                                                                     
 78 Sharpe Holdings, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 14-1507, 2015 
WL 5449491, at *8 (8th Cir. Sept. 17, 2015). 
 79 See Miller v. Davis, No. 15-CV-44-DLB, 2015 WL 4866729, at *8 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 
12, 2015). 
 80 See generally Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008) 
(recognizing a state’s interests in preventing voter fraud). 
 81 See Marchi v. Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs., 173 F.3d 469, 477 (2nd Cir. 1999) 
(“Because BOCES has a strong, perhaps compelling, interest in avoiding Establishment 
Clause violations, it may proscribe interactions between teachers and parents that risk 
giving the impression that the school endorses religion.”) (citation omitted). 
 82 See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192–93 (1991) (recognizing right of 
government to make and implement its own value judgments). 
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entitled to equal dignity; the state is entitled to implement Obergefell by using 
a uniform marriage certificate.83 
It is unlikely that the state has a compelling interest in Davis’ name, rather 
than the deputy clerk’s name, appearing on the document itself because that 
name variance does not suggest that one kind of marriage license is a second-
class document.84 But the kinds of changes that Davis has sought to implement 
appear to invalidate and demean the status of the documents and are 
inconsistent with the state’s compelling interest in protecting the fundamental 
right to marry of its citizens. 
E. Least Restrictive Means 
If a court concludes that Kentucky has a compelling state interest in 
issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples, then the issue becomes whether 
Kentucky has an alternative that would allow it to issue the marriage licenses 
and certificates while also respecting Davis’ religious beliefs. This issue is 
thorny because it depends, in part, on what accommodation Davis would find 
acceptable. Although Davis filed a third-party complaint seeking injunctive 
relief against Governor Beshear and Commissioner Onkst, she did not state 
precisely how these state actors could accommodate her religious beliefs and 
meet their compelling state interest in ensuring that marriages are available in 
Rowan County.85 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, contains a religious 
accommodation rule similar to the KRFA.86 Under Title VII, a request for a 
religious accommodation “involves an interactive process that requires 
participation by both the employer and the employee.”87 Rather than engage in 
that interactive process, Davis engaged in self-help by refusing to issue any 
marriage licenses and later modified the forms to satisfy her religious beliefs. 
As noted by the district court, this kind of self-help presents Establishment 
                                                                                                                     
 83 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2594 (2015) (“The lifelong union of a man 
and a woman always has promised nobility and dignity to all persons, without regard to 
their station in life.”). 
 84 See, e.g., Slater v. Douglas Cty., 743 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1195 (D. Or. 2010) 
(“[D]omestic partnership registrant has no cognizable right to insist that a specific clerical 
employee with religious-based objections process the registration as opposed to another 
employee (having no such objections). So long as the registration is processed in a timely 
fashion, the registrants have suffered no injury.”). 
 85 Davis Third-Party Complaint, supra note 22; Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff Kim 
Davis’ Response in Opposition to Third-Party Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Third-Party 
Complaint, Miller v. Davis, No. 15-CV-44-DLB (E.D. Ky. Sept. 24, 2015). 
 86 See Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 701, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2012) (requiring an 
employer to make reasonable accommodations to religious needs of its employees unless 
those accommodations impose an undue hardship). 
 87 Thomas v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 225 F.3d 1149, 1155 (10th Cir. 2000). 
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Clause problems because she is “openly adopting a policy that promotes her 
own religious convictions at the expense of others.”88 
Had she initiated an appropriate interactive process, the issue would be 
whether an accommodation is possible. An obvious solution would be for the 
state to be required to modify its forms to recognize the “or” phrase under state 
law—that a deputy clerk or clerk can sign these forms. The state could even 
agree to remove the designation of the precise county in which the couple got 
married, because that particular state statutory requirement does not seem 
essential to any compelling state interest. 
But would such a solution really satisfy Davis? She might act like the 
Catholic pharmacist in Noesen v. Medical Staffing Network, Inc.89 who put 
customers on hold indefinitely when they called requesting birth control and 
walked away from customers at the counter, “refus[ing] to tell anyone that a 
customer needed assistance.”90 Or, she might act like the entities covered by 
the ACA who insist that they cannot even notify the government of their 
objection to providing contraceptives, so that the government can make 
alternative arrangements for that coverage.91 Davis is the head clerk in her 
office, so an accommodation will necessarily require her cooperation in some 
way, such as arranging for her deputy clerk to authorize marriage licenses and 
certificates. In order for people to enjoy the fundamental right to marry, she 
must agree to some process that facilitates marriage without the burden of 
traveling to another county. 
If Davis is willing to cooperate by allowing others to issue the licenses and 
certificates, the district court’s decision in Slater v. Douglas County92 suggests 
a model solution. In Slater, a clerk who objected to processing same-sex 
domestic partner registrations could be relieved of those responsibilities 
because “a domestic partnership registrant has no cognizable right to insist that 
a specific clerical employee with religious-based objections process the 
registration . . . [s]o long as the registration is processed in a timely fashion.”93 
However, unlike Davis, the clerk in Slater did not object to having other clerks 
perform the functions she found unacceptable. 
If such a solution were put in place, it would be crucially important that 
Davis not be allowed to demean the right of same-sex couples to marry. 
Unlike Davis, the employee in Slater who refused to process domestic 
partnership registrations was a low-level employee with little or no direct 
contact with the public. Davis has sought to be exempted from issuing any 
marriage licenses or certificates to express her view that same-sex marriage is 
immoral. While she may make that statement as a private citizen, she may not 
                                                                                                                     
 88 Miller v. Davis, No. 15-CV-44-DLB, 2015 WL 4866729, at *8 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 12, 
2015). 
 89 Noesen v. Med. Staffing Network, Inc., 232 Fed. Appx. 581 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 90 Id. at 583. 
 91 Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 791 F.3d 792, 796 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 92 Slater v. Douglas Cty., 743 F. Supp. 2d 1188 (D. Or. 2010). 
 93 Id. at 1195. 
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associate those views with the government. That view—that same-sex 
marriages are not recognized by the state—is constitutionally impermissible. 
Thus, by accommodating Davis is the state associating itself with her 
constitutionally impermissible views on marriage? 
In both Lawrence v. Texas,94 and Romer v. Evans,95 a purposive inquiry 
was a central element of the Court’s conclusion that the state had acted 
unconstitutionally.96 The Lawrence Court invalidated Texas’s sodomy statute 
as unconstitutional not merely because the state might impose a prison 
sentence on gay men and lesbians for engaging in sexual activity, but because 
the state had the purpose of expressing its moral disapproval of a group.97 The 
state was not permitted to “demean their existence or control their destiny by 
making their private sexual conduct a crime.”98 Application of the KRFA to 
facilitate Davis’ views on the marriages of same-sex couples puts the state, 
itself, in the position of furthering an unconstitutional purpose. In other words, 
her request for a broad exemption is a pretext for the impermissible expression 
by the state of the moral disapproval of a group. 
IV. THE FUTURE 
Resistance to same-sex marriage on religious grounds is unlikely to end 
any time soon. Two states have passed laws to exempt some state employees 
from facilitating same-sex marriages in conflict with their religious beliefs.99 
Those statutes ensure that marriage licenses or certificates will be issued in the 
couple’s county, even if an individual employee does not participate in that 
process.100 Those exemptions, however, may be constitutionally problematic if 
                                                                                                                     
 94 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  
 95 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 96 See, e.g., id. at 633 (“[W]e ensure that classifications are not drawn for the purpose 
of disadvantaging the group burdened by the law.”). 
 97 See id. at 644 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567 (stating 
that “[t]heir penalties and purposes . . . have more far-reaching consequences”) (emphasis 
added). 
 98 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
 99 See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-5.5 (West, Westlaw through ch. 237, 2015 Reg. 
Sess.) (“Recusal of certain public officials”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-20-4 (LexisNexis 
2013) (“Duties of country clerk”). 
 100 In North Carolina, the assistant register of deeds and deputy register of deeds has 
the right to recuse themselves from issuing marriage licenses but the register of deeds has 
the responsibility to ensure that licenses are still issued. § 51-5.5(b). In Utah, the county 
clerk must name a designee if he or she is unwilling to solemnize a legal marriage. § 17-
20-4(2). In North Carolina, according to a news report, there is a county in which all 
magistrates have refused to issue marriage licenses. See Beth Walton, McDowell 
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they are a pretext for the state expressing its moral disapproval of the 
marriages of same-sex couples. 
The problem for some county clerks around the country is that they simply 
may be unable to work in a job with a primary duty of issuing marriage 
licenses in conformance with state and federal law, because they would 
consider their actions to be facilitating same-sex marriages. They may not 
even feel comfortable engaging in the kind of notifications required by the 
state statutes exempting clerks from facilitating same-sex marriages. Like the 
pharmacist in Noesen, who was unwilling to cooperate with co-workers to fill 
prescriptions for contraceptives, some clerks may remain unwilling to 
cooperate with co-workers to ensure the issuance of marriage licenses and 
certificates. 
Some jobs in our society conflict with people’s religious or moral beliefs. 
A Sabbath-observing Jew cannot work at a job with Saturday-only hours. A 
pacifist-Quaker cannot work in a combat position in the armed forces. County 
clerk may be a job that is not suitable for someone opposed to same-sex 
marriage on religious grounds. It may be time for Davis to look for a new job 
because her request for a religious accommodation may not be possible 
without the state facilitating conduct that unconstitutionally demeans the 
marriages of same-sex couples. 
